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I. INTRODUCTION
A new technology can expose the cracks in legal doctrine. Sometimes a technology resists analogy. Sometimes through analogies, it reveals inconsistencies in
the law, flaws in framing, or friction in the fit between different parts of the legal
system. This essay addresses robots in the home, and what they reveal about U.S.
privacy law. Household robots might not themselves destroy U.S. privacy law, but
they will reveal its inconsistencies, and may show where it is most likely to fracture.
Just as drones are serving as a legislative “privacy catalyst”1—encouraging the enactment of new privacy laws as people realize they are not legally protected from
privacy invasions—household robots may serve as a doctrinal privacy catalyst.
* Assistant Professor of Law at the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, and Affiliated
Fellow at the Information Society Project at Yale Law School. Thanks to Jack Balkin for co-teaching our
Artificial Intelligence and Robots seminar, Ryan Calo for welcoming me into the law-and-robotics community, and Bryan H. Corbellini for giving me a much-needed afternoon off. Thanks to Scott Peppett and Guy
Rub for helpful comments. Mistakes are my own.
1. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 29–33 (2011).
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Household robots may spur doctrinal changes by virtue of a number of their technosocial characteristics.
Some household robots are already here: the Roomba already vacuums our
floors and scares our pets. In Japan, fuzzy robot seals are used in eldercare.2 Robots
may come into the home first as toys. Mattel is touting its speaking doll, “Hello Barbie,” and the robotic dinosaur toy, Pleo, uses speech recognition and adapts to its
owner’s behavior.3 Household and caretaker robots are on the agenda for major technology companies. Bill Gates in 2007 called for a “robot in every home . . . .”4 And
Toyota is currently experimenting with “care assist robots” that can lift and carry
elderly patients, preventing injury to human caretakers and allowing people with dementia to remain longer in their homes. 5 Robot & Frank, an only slightly futuristic
movie about an elderly man with a friendly caretaker robot, envisions a near future
in which privacy, ethics, and relationships are challenged by a helpful household
robot.6
There are two basic legal puzzles raised—or revealed—by household robots.
First, there is the question of whether a robot’s permission to be in a space also grants
it permission to record information about that space. Second, there is the broader
legal question of whether traditional legal protection of the home as a privileged,
private space will withstand invasion by digital technology that has permission to be
there. In other words, when we agree to allow robots in our homes, are we correspondingly agreeing to allow them to record? To allow in the third parties with which
robots communicate? This essay’s basic claim is that the legally salient aspects of
home robots may drive a collision between the doctrinal understanding of privacy in
real physical space, and privacy in the digital realm. That conflict in turn reveals
inconsistent understandings of permission and consent in context, across privacy law.
This essay begins by identifying the legally salient features of home robots: the
aspects of home robots that will likely drive the most interesting legal questions. It
then explores how current privacy law governing both law enforcement and private
parties addresses a number of questions raised by home robots. First, how does privacy law treat entities that enter places (physically, or through sense-enhancing technologies) where they are not invited? Second, how does privacy law treat entities that
are invited into a physical space, but were not invited to record in that space? How
does privacy law treat consent, both express and implied? Fourth, how does privacy
law address entities that lull—or deceive—people into revealing more than they intend to? And finally, in the private actor context, will robotic recording be considered
to be speech?
2. Andrew Griffiths, How Paro the Robot Seal is Being Used to Help UK Dementia Patients,
GUARDIAN (July 8, 2014, 9:01 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jul/08/paro-robot-seal-dementia-patients-nhs-japan.
3. Barbie Doll Will Be Internet Connected to Chat to Kids, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31502898; For Pleo the Robot Dinosaur, a Second Act in an American Life, CNET (January 9, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/for-pleo-the-robot-dinosaur-a-second-act-in-an-american-life/.
4. See Bill Gates, A Robot in Every Home, SCI. AM., January 2007, at 58, 65, available at
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/A_Robot_in_Every_Home.pdf.
5. Wendy Hall, Technology Could Help People With Dementia Remain in Their Homes,
GUARDIAN (June 23, 2014, 3:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/social-care-network/2014/jun/23/technology-help-people-dementia-longitude-prize.
6. ROBOT & FRANK (Samuel Goldwyn Films 2012).
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The rise of robots in the home is a form of technosocial change.7 Both the technology and the social norms around its use will develop. That technosocial change
in turn will reveal strains in the law’s treatment of privacy harms, especially around
questions of what constitutes sensitive information, and the role of consent or assumption of risk.
Evaluating how home robots might be treated under U.S. privacy law leads to
at least one particularly interesting observation: that U.S. privacy law’s treatment of
the government and treatment of private actors are not aligned with respect to the
voluntary sharing of information by a data subject. In the Fourth Amendment context, sharing information with a third party gives rise to an assumption of risk that
law enforcement might access that information—and thus means law enforcement
may access that information without a warrant. In the private actor context, however,
sharing information with a third party gives rise to obligations on behalf of that third
party to protect the information.
This essay also contributes the observation that the legally interesting aspects
of a new technology will vary depending on what kind of law is applied. What is
interesting about a technology from the perspective of, say, tort law or tax law is not
necessarily interesting from the perspective of privacy law. This observation responds to Ryan Calo’s recent discussion of why robots are or are not exceptional.8 A
technology and it social uses may be exceptional in different areas of law for different
reasons—and may simultaneously be completely unexceptional elsewhere.
II. WHY HOUSEHOLD ROBOTS ARE LEGALLY INTERESTING
Robots are embodied technologies that contain software, or code, and move
and act on other objects in real space. While there is no single definition of a robot,
some consensus has formed around defining robots as technologies that sense, think,
and then act on and in the physical world.9 The Internet of Things and household
robots raise privacy questions along the same spectrum, but certain features of robots—that they can move by themselves, may make their “own” decisions, and have
social meaning—will raise fairly unique privacy questions.
The technical definition of what a robot is differs from what might make a robot
interesting from a legal perspective. This section thus addresses legally salient aspects of household robots: the aspects that are particularly of interest to privacy law.
To identify the legally salient features of household robots, we must start with (1)
the privacy harms at issue, and (2) why implied consent or assumption of risk is
central to the legal discussion.
A. Types of Privacy Harm
To understand what aspects of household robots are legally salient, we have to
articulate what privacy harms household robots might cause. Robots, as part of their
basic functionality, sense and record their environment. They will often share that
7. Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications
of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 619 (2011) (using the term “technosocial” to refer to the “intertwined effects of technological and social change”).
8. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2402972.
9. Id. at 117.
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information with third parties, or store that information in the cloud. Household robots thus pose two basic privacy concerns: concerns over the excessive sharing and
processing of information, and concerns over the initial recording of information.
Information sharing can threaten contextual integrity: the reliance people place
on the idea that information revealed in one context, governed by one set of social
norms, will not be moved into or used in another.10 The sharing of information gathered by household robots would take information revealed in the home, and share or
use it in very different contexts.11 This type of privacy violation could cause chilling
and conforming effects. When information revealed in the home is shared and used
outside of the home, people may stop trusting that the home is a private location, and
may stop sharing information and conform their behavior to majority norms even
within the home.12
A second, related type of privacy harm threatened by household robots occurs
at the moment at which information is captured.13 The second type of privacy harm
that household robots threaten is to interfere with individual’s ability to accurately
dynamically manage social accessibility at a particular moment, by capturing information people assume will not be captured. People often use physical features of
their environment, such as walls, to manage their social accessibility. They also rely
on features of social relationships—the idea that a trusted person will not disclose
information to third parties—and on temporal features of relationships, such as forgetfulness over time. Household robots threaten the ability of individuals to conduct
this “boundary management” because in addition to crossing physical boundaries, or
being able to “sense” through physical boundaries using sense-enhancement technologies, robots’ social features may elicit trust where trust is not deserved. Thus household robots pose at least two harms with respect to information capture: people may
inaccurately manage their social accessibility, or knowing that they are watched, may
again change their behavior at the moment of interaction.
B. Consent or Assumption of Risk
A recurring theme in U.S. privacy doctrine is that in certain contexts, by disclosing information people assume the risk that information will travel, and thus cannot claim that their privacy has been violated. 14 For example, two people embracing
at a fair could not claim that their privacy had been violated when a photograph of
the embrace ended up on the front page of a newspaper, because they assumed the
risk the information would travel by embracing in a public space.15 And under the
Fourth Amendment, you currently have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the

10. See Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy
in Public, 17 L. & PHIL. 559, 567–68 (1998), available at http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/privacy.pdf.
11. See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119
(2004).
12. See generally Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465 (2015).
13. Margot E. Kaminski, Theory of Privacy for Information-Gathering Laws, WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (on file with author).
14. See generally Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441 (1953).
15. Id.

2015]

SYMPOSIUM EDITION

665

phone numbers you dial, in part because you share them with the telephone company.16 Perhaps the biggest doctrinal puzzle raised by household robots will be
whether information revealed in a traditionally private location—the home—can be
treated as not private because it has been shared with third parties as a part of a robot’s functioning.
C. The Legally Salient Aspects of Household Robots
As discussed, household robots may cause two types of privacy harms: violation of contextual integrity and boundary management challenges. Whether those
privacy harms will be legally protectable may hinge on whether people are understood to be assuming a risk of privacy violations by sharing information with third
parties. This understanding gives us the background for identifying the legally salient
aspects of household robots.
Ryan Calo has suggested that robots in general will have three effects on privacy: they will increase the amount of direct surveillance, they will increase access
to formerly private spaces, and they will have social meaning. 17 Calo has also suggested more generally that the “essential qualities” of robots—which I understand to
be the legally salient qualities of robots—are (1) embodiment, (2) emergence, and
(3) social valence.18 This essay takes a narrower approach, asking what aspects of
household robots in particular are legally salient, from the perspective of privacy law.
Interestingly, taking this narrower approach reveals slightly different salient features.
This suggests that what is legally salient about a new technology will depend on
which laws are applied.
The ability of robots to sense and record information, and likelihood that
they will share that information with third parties for storage and processing purposes, are clearly legally salient features from a privacy perspective. On the one
hand, the fact that robots must take in information to properly navigate an environment (just as a phone call must be made on telephone lines) suggests that the sensing
might be treated as necessary for functionality and deserving of legal privacy protection. On the other hand, the known ability of robots to record massive amounts of
information about private places raises the question of whether household robot owners have consented to that recording, implicitly or explicitly, by having a robot in the
home.
The sensory aspect of robots also raises interesting legal questions about how
to treat a robot (1) that records more information than is necessary for functionality;
(2) that records more information than it has told its owner it is recording (fails to
provide notice); (3) that has been given permission to enter or operate in certain locations, but not to record in those locations; and (4) that senses or records information
humans aren’t used to monitoring with their own senses (like temperature). The centrality of sensing and recording to household robots’ functionality is a legally salient
aspect of household robotics, especially when that sensing involves non-visual
senses such as thermal imaging.

16.
17.

See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
M. Ryan Calo, Robots and Privacy, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 187, 187–88 (Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & George A. Bekey eds., 2012).
18. Calo, supra note 9 (manuscript at 120–36).
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The ability of household robots to move and otherwise interfere with their
physical environments is a second legally salient feature. If a robot can open doors,
or go into rooms of a house where it has not been invited, it is capable of violating
contextual integrity or threatening boundary management. But if a person fully understands that their household robot is capable of going wherever it wants, then the
known ability of robots to move from room to room or through doors may suggest
that the robot’s owner has assumed the risk that the home is no longer private. Thus
movement is one legally salient feature of household robots: depending on how
courts characterize it, movement could push the legal doctrine in a number of directions.
The social valence or social meaning of home robots—that is, the fact that
robots may be anthropomorphic or appear as quasi-human actors—will be salient to
privacy law. There is evidence that people treat anthropomorphic robots with increased compassion and trust. 19 A robot that lulls people into revealing more than
they intend to may be viewed as deceptive technology; or it may be treated similarly
to false human friends.
Finally, the ability of robots to process information, or “think” and “make
decisions,” is legally salient. Emergent behavior could affect the scope of implied
consent or assumption of risk if household robots make decisions outside the scope
of what their owners believe they have agreed to. It may also affect discussions of
what kind of liability regime should be in place for robot creators, influencing discussion of whether there should be a strict liability regime or negligence standard, or
something else. Finally, emergent behavior will affect legal conversations about the
applicability of the emerging First Amendment right to record, and whether robots—
or their programmers—should be legally considered to be “authors” of the recorded
information they gather.20
In summary, the legally salient aspects of household robots include: (1) their
need to sense and ability to record vast amounts of information that they often will
share with third parties; (2) their ability to independently move in a physical environment; (3) what Calo calls their “social valence” or anthropomorphic characteristics; and (4) their ability to process information, or “think,” in complex, unpredictable ways. Of Calo’s named qualities of robots, embodiment is less important to privacy law, except as it affects the ability to move through physical space or creates a
social presence through anthropomorphic characteristics.
III. WHAT HOUSEHOLD ROBOTS REVEAL ABOUT PRIVACY LAW
This section turns from household robots themselves to what they reveal about
U.S. law. New technologies are often incorporated into case law by analogy.21 But
trying to fit household robots into existing boxes under current case law reveals problems and inconsistencies in privacy doctrine. This section begins by discussing
19. Calo, supra note 9 (manuscript at 132, 135).
20. Jane R. Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 61 (2014); see also Annemarie
Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 5 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 22
(2012) (for discussion of AI authorship in copyright law).
21. Neil M. Richards & William D. Smart, How Should the Law Think About Robots? 19 (2013)
(prelimary draft), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2263363.
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household robots and the Fourth Amendment, and then turns to law governing private actors rather than the government.
A. Government and the Fourth Amendment
The home is privileged in Fourth Amendment analysis; it receives “paramount”
privacy protection.22 The “very core" of the Fourth Amendment is “the right of a man
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."23 In some ways, U.S. privacy jurisprudence treats “information revealed in
the home” as its own category of sensitive information. 24
But the third party doctrine in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence explains that
when people voluntarily share information with third parties, they do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. 25 Other cases suggest that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy from a privacy-invading technology
that is in general or regular public use.26 Will the centrality of the home in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence withstand the incursion of household robots? The answer
to this question depends in large part on the power of analogies, and on how far courts
are willing to extend current understandings about assumptions of risk or implied
consent to information gathered in the home.
This Section outlines relevant Fourth Amendment case law on the following
questions: first, how might home robots be treated when they enter or observe physical spaces to which they have not been invited? Second, how might home robots be
treated when they record information in a location where they have been invited to
be—but in which they were not invited to record? Third, how might the presence of
home robots be understood to imply consent to the reuse of information? Fourth, how
might actual contractual agreements and/or privacy policies around home robots be
treated, under the Fourth Amendment? And fifth, how might Fourth Amendment
doctrine treat falsely reassuring or outright deceptive robots?
1. Entering where not invited
Household robots might enter a physical space in a home to which they have
not been invited, or use sense-enhancing technology to “see” into that space. The
legally salient features of household robots with respect to this question are their
ability to move, to sense using sense-enhancing technology, and possibly the ability
to make emergent decisions that cause them to act “independently,” or contrary to
owners’ preferences.

22. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
23. Id. (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961)).
24. Sensitive information receives more privacy protection. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information,
88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). For a discussion of how the home is treated as sensitive in Fourth
Amendment doctrine, see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of
Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 32).
25. E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
26. See generally Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 455 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asking whether “the observation cannot be said to be from a vantage point generally used
by the public . . . .”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence once was “tied to common-law trespass,”
although it did not require technical trespass, only “actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.”27 The Supreme Court famously decoupled Fourth Amendment violations from trespass in Katz v. United States, explaining that the Constitution “protects people, not places.”28 A person’s privacy could be protected in an area
outside the home and accessible to the public if the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy.29 But the Supreme Court also observed in Katz that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection.”30
The question thus is as follows: when a person lets a robot into her house, and
assumes it will remain in one area of the house, is it a violation of that person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy for the robot to enter, or use sense-enhancing technology to virtually enter, a room or space where it is not supposed to be? To bring
this discussion into the scope of the Fourth Amendment, this question presumes that
the robot is either controlled or accessed by law enforcement.
The Supreme Court addressed a related question when it evaluated police use
of sense-enhancing technology in Kyllo v. United States.31 There, the Court concluded that police could not use thermal imaging to “see” into the interior of the home
without a warrant.32 The majority analogized thermal imaging to trespass, rather than
to gathering information such as smells, which could be picked up remotely by humans without technological aids.33 The Court explained that “obtaining by senseenhancing technology any information regarding the home’s interior that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question
is not in general public use.”34
The question, then, may be whether police access to information obtained by a
robot in searches unauthorized by a homeowner constitutes use of “technology . . .
in general public use.”35 Many people may end up with household robots, which may
make the robots themselves technology in general public use. But it seems unlikely
that people will generally access information from each other’s robots, suggesting
that government coopting of household robots’ ability to move from room to room
or see through walls would not involve technology in general public use.
However, three cases on aircraft photography may cut the other way. In California v. Ciraolo and Florida v. Riley, the Supreme Court found that no warrant is
required for law enforcement to employ naked-eye observation or aerial photography
from a fixed-wing aircraft, or from a helicopter.36 In a third case, Dow Chemical v.
United States, the Court found that enhanced aerial photography did not require a
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
(1989).

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31; Silverman, 365 U.S. at 510–12.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
See id.
Id. at 351.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 28 (citation omitted).
Id.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445

2015]

SYMPOSIUM EDITION

669

warrant.37 The Court reasoned that planes and helicopters are common technologies,
and thus people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy against observations
made from them. If robots become truly ubiquitous, like planes, then these cases
suggest the Fourth Amendment might not offer protection—even if robots have not
been granted express permission to be in a particular room or space.
In recent cases, however, the Court has employed preservationist reasoning to
protect a level of privacy available before the development of new technologies.38 In
both a recent case on searching cellular telephones, and in Kyllo, the Court referred
to the necessity of preserving the degree of privacy protection in existence at the time
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.39 If this is truly a guiding principle for the
Court, then information gathered by nosy, trespassing robots from the home should
remain protected by the Fourth Amendment, regardless of how common robots become.
2. Recording where they are invited to be, but not to record
A second Fourth Amendment question is how to treat robots that are invited
into private spaces, but not invited to record or observe using another sense. In other
words, people may expect household robots to move around in a space, and to perform an expected function, but not to record interactions or share them with other
parties.
A recent Supreme Court case can be understood as applicable to this scenario.
The Court recently considered whether a drug-sniffing dog brought by police officers
onto a porch violated the Fourth Amendment. 40 The Court reasoned that while a police officer may rely on an “implicit license” to walk on the porch to knock at the
front door like other visitors, that “implicit license” did not extend to using a trained
drug-sniffing dog.41
This case suggests that if a household robot has been invited to a private space
(ie has a license to be there), but a person can exhibit a real expectation that the robot
would not be recording information or using sense-enhancing technology without
notice, that person might have a reasonable expectation of privacy against the unpermitted recording.
3. Implied Assumption of Risk (or Implied Consent)
Both of the previous two scenarios involved a robot breaching its owner’s orders. In the above two scenarios, a household robot exceeds explicit permissions or
ignores an explicit ban by (a) entering (physically or sensually) into spaces unwelcomed, or (b) recording unwelcomed in a space where it might be permitted to phys-

37. Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
38. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27–28; Riley, 488 U.S. at 445; see also Orin Kerr, An EquilibriumAdjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 426, 489–99 (2011).
39. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28 (“This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”); Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494–95
(2014).
40. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
41. Id. at 1415.
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ically be. But what about when a robot’s owner cannot claim to have denied permission to the robot, either to access specific areas or to record that environment? This
is where the doctrinal muddle in Fourth Amendment law revealed by household robots—the tension between third party doctrine and protection for the home—gets
most interesting.
Most robots will share information with third parties for processing purposes
or just to store information in the cloud. The Supreme Court has in a line of cases
explained that people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information,
such as the records of phone numbers dialed, revealed to or stored with third parties. 42
If a person fails to restrict their household robot’s access to particular parts of the
house, or cannot indicate that she thought the robot wasn’t recording, then information gathered by the robot and sent to the cloud or revealed to the robot’s seller
would likely fall within third party doctrine. Then police may access that information
through the third party without a warrant. To be clear: there are complex statutory
schemes in place for handling police access to stored communications and telephone
numbers dialed.43 But these statutes apply to communications, and thus likely do not
apply to most information robots will store.
Justice Sotomayor recently suggested that the third party doctrine has no place
in our digital world, since most information is now stored with or communicated
through third parties.44 In a recent decision on cell phone searches, Chief Justice Roberts suggested (but did not hold) that people could have an expectation of privacy in
phone numbers when that information is combined with more sensitive information
such as labeling a particular number with a name, or “home.”45 These indicators suggest that members of the Court are getting ready to reconsider third party doctrine,
or at least to considerably narrow its scope. Similarly, a recent D.C. Circuit decision
evaluating the constitutionality of the government’s bulk storage of telephone
metadata explained that big data is different in kind from the information at issue
when the Supreme Court first created the third party doctrine. 46
Household robots may place the third party doctrine in an even rockier position.
Part of the reasoning that gives rise to the third party doctrine is that the information
at issue is not inherently sensitive—in the case of phone numbers, it is considered to
be “envelope” rather than “content” information.47 When household robots record
information in the home, courts may find that information about the home is inherently more sensitive than “envelope” information like phone numbers, and thus refuse to apply the third party doctrine. We can see this happening in at least two
places: first, the Sixth Circuit has held that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of one’s email, even though people technically share their email
42. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
43. E.g. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2014); Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2014); Pen Registers and Traps, 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2014).
44. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
45. Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
46. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28 (D.D.C. 2013); but see In re FBI, 2013 WL 5741573
(FISA Ct. 2013).
47. See, e.g., Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2105, 2113–2117 (2009). But see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) (treating
bank records as “less sensitive” information because the records perform an act [transaction], not because
they are envelope information).
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with third parties such as Google.48 Second, the Eleventh Circuit has pointed out that
location information in the home is sensitive information49—even though location
information outside of the home was held in older Supreme Court cases not to be
inherently sensitive information.50 So there is developing precedent for the idea that
being in or from the home makes information sensitive in nature.51
4. Actual (Contractual) Agreements/ Privacy Policies
One of the more interesting questions that might arise around the sharing of
information with third parties by household robots is the impact of an actual agreement—for example, a privacy policy—on a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” If a person has a robot in their home, and has agreed to a particularly permissive privacy policy, can they still have a reasonable expectation of privacy against
the revelation of that information to the government?
The Sixth Circuit addressed this question in its email case. 52 The court reasoned
that while some subscriber agreements might be “sweeping enough to defeat a reasonable expectation of privacy … we doubt that will be the case in most situations.”53
Importantly, the Sixth Circuit held that the ability of the third party to access sensitive
information—in that case, the contents of emails—does not abolish an expectation
of privacy against law enforcement in that information. 54
5. Lulling people into revealing information
There is no Fourth Amendment doctrine that is clearly analogous to lulling
people into revealing information through the social/anthropomorphic features of robots. But what case law there is suggests that the Fourth Amendment would not protect us from what we reveal to deceptive or reassuring robots. One could analogize
the idea of the deceptive robot to a “false friend”: police do not need a warrant to get
information from a confidential informant, or friend who decides to turn on a person.55 More broadly speaking, the Supreme Court has upheld deceptive behavior by
police, including consent to enter a residence when police commit fraud, or falsely
claim to be there for a legitimate purpose.56 But if robots are instead analogized to
48. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
49. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that in light of Jones,
the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for cell site location information and the Stored Communications
Act protections were inadequate). See also In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of
Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312 (3d Cir. 2010).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
51. But see In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 609 (5th Cir.
2013).
52. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 266.
53. Id. at 286.
54. “[T]he mere ability of a third-party intermediary to access the contents of a communication
cannot be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id.
55. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation
where petitioner “was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his wrongdoing”);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966). The Supreme Court has held that police also do not need
a warrant to bug a confidential informant with the informant’s permission. United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 749 (1971).
56. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (“A government agent, in the same manner
as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very
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diaries, rather than independent actors, then barring third party doctrine and storage
of the information elsewhere, there may be a reasonable expectation of privacy in
what gets revealed to a reassuring robot-friend.57 Which analogy courts choose—the
false friend, or the diary—may be central to how deceptive robots are treated in the
law enforcement context.58
B. Private Parties
The government will not be the only party interested in information gathered
by household robots. And as evidenced by the above discussion of the third party
doctrine, private parties may actually have more direct access to information gathered by household robots than law enforcement will. It will be valuable for behavioral advertising, for modifying or monitoring robot behavior, and for innovating to
fill unmet needs.
This Section evaluates several questions involving privacy violations by private
parties. Most of these overlap with the questions addressed above in the context of
Fourth Amendment doctrine. And interestingly, the answers in the case of private
parties may differ. Thus contemplating household robots reveals interesting inconsistencies in U.S. privacy law, where some doctrinal areas may be evolving out of
pace with others.
This Section first addresses how the law might treat privacy violations by private actors through robots that enter where they are not invited. Then it addresses
robots that exceed the scope of their permitted entry into a private space by recording
information revealed in that private space. It addresses implied assumptions of privacy risks; and actual contractual agreements. Finally, this Section discusses how to
address robots that lull people into revealing more information to third parties than
they intended, and, briefly, the question of whether household robots’ recording of
information about their environments could constitute “speech” by private parties.
1. Entering where not invited
Just as with Fourth Amendment doctrine, in privacy law addressing private actors, trespass and privacy violations can be linked. The privacy tort of intrusion upon
seclusion does not technically hinge on location, but does in practice suggest that
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in privileged solitary places such as the
purposes contemplated by the occupant.”). See also United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432, 435
(9th Cir. 1993) (“we have held that a law enforcement officer's use of a ruse to gain admittance does not
implicate section 3109 because it entails no breaking”); Dickey v. United States, 332 F.2d 773, 777–78 (9th
Cir. 1964); Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 1959). See also Elizabeth E. Joh, Bait, Mask,
and Ruse: Technology and Police Deception, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 246 (Apr. 2015).
However, police may not lie about the existence of a search warrant, or lie about their true purpose
once they identify themselves as government. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); United
States v. Bosse, 898 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977) (“It is a
well established rule that a consent search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the consent was
induced by the deceit, trickery or misrepresentation of the Internal Revenue agent.”). But see United States v.
Briley, 726 F.2d 1301, 1305 (1984) (finding that cryptic statements about the nature of the investigation do
not necessarily invalidate consent to search).
57. See Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2479 (2014) (referring to a diary as a “highly personal
item”).
58. Richards & Smart, supra note 21.
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home.59 If a robot enters a room where it is not invited, acting as an agent of a private
party, then it may commit the intrusion tort. Here, a household robot’s emergent behavior may create interesting problems around finding liability for those private actors who produced or allegedly control the robot.
California has legislated against the use of new technologies to gain access to
areas where information could not previously have been gathered without trespassing.60 This approach reflects Justice Scalia’s language in Kyllo, the thermal imaging
case, where Justice Scalia noted that virtual entrance into the home by technology
not in public use was a Fourth Amendment violation. 61 If a robot is given permission
to enter part of the home, and exceeds the scope of that permission by entering a
forbidden location either physically or technologically, it might be in violation of this
law in California.
2. Recording where they are invited to be, but not to record
A more interesting question in the case of private actors is whether robots that
are invited to be in a location, but not invited to record there, commit a privacy violation. The alternative is that their activity—unlike law enforcement activity—might
be protected by the First Amendment. I discuss this prospect more below, in B(6).
Existing case law points in both directions. On the one hand, some courts have
found that granting permission to someone to be in a location constitutes granting
permission to record, or at least obviates an expectation of privacy. 62 Other courts,
however, have distinguished between inviting somebody in or confiding in them, and
allowing them to record that interaction.63
In one case, a court held that even though a victim of a car crash understood
that a nurse would witness and remember conversations, the crash victim’s privacy
was violated when those conversations were recorded.64 In another, reporters who
entered a quack “doctor’s” home office by pretending to be patients were found by
the Ninth Circuit to have violated the quack’s privacy, even though they were not
technically trespassing.65 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit found that news reporters who recorded fraudulent behavior at an eye doctor’s office by posing as patients did not violate an expectation of privacy. 66
The illicitly recording robot may face divided case law. The deciding factor
may be a distinction noted by the Seventh Circuit: unpermitted recording in the home
poses a greater privacy risk that unpermitted recording in public. 67

59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(b) (1977).
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (Supp. 2015).
61. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
62. See, e.g., Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1353–54 (7th Cir. 1995).
63. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
64. Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 497 (Cal. 1998).
65. Dietemann., 449 F.2d at 246, 249. See also Food Lion v. ABC Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th
Cir. 2001) (discussing First Amendment limits and duty of loyalty, more than privacy.).
66. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1654–55.
67. Id. at 1352.
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3. Implied Assumption of Risk (or Implied Consent)
As in Fourth Amendment cases, courts in cases about private actors often find
no expectation of privacy where people assume a considerable risk that their actions
will not be private. For example, as discussed earlier, the couple embracing at a fair
were found not to have an expectation of privacy because they had assumed a risk of
discovery by appearing together in a crowded, public space.68 However, a woman
photographed with her skirt up at a funhouse ride was not found to have assumed the
risk of this photograph occurring, even though it took place in public, likely because
her exposed body fell into the category of sensitive information. 69
Assessment of whether owning a household robot implies consent to having
information recorded may once again hinge on whether courts treat information revealed in the home as sensitive, or break it into subcategories where some information is not sensitive and some (for example, sexual or bodily information) is. 70
4. Actual (Contractual) Agreements/Privacy Policies
The most interesting area of privacy law governing private actors with respect
to household robots—and the area revealed to be most different from Fourth Amendment case law—involves actual contracts or privacy policies. Remember that in the
Fourth Amendment context courts have applied the third party doctrine to find that
people usually do not have an expectation of privacy in information revealed to third
parties, reasoning that in revealing information to third parties a person consents to
its not being private any more.71 But in the private actor context, courts sometimes
find expectations of privacy even when a person has technically consented to sharing
that information with others.72
Christine Jolls has noted that in some contexts, courts outright ignore written
agreements in cases evaluating privacy violations. Courts look beyond consent, even
when it is given by written agreement, to substantive privacy norms.73 Similarly, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) uses its Section 5 authority to enforce against private companies not only when they fail to uphold their own privacy policies, but also
when a privacy policy is found to be inadequate, or “unfair.” 74
In other words, in the Fourth Amendment context, courts use actual or implied
consent to explain away a privacy interest, where in the private actor context, they
may consider substantive privacy norms to find a privacy violation even where consent has technically been granted. In fact, the FTC’s privacy enforcement takes place
68. Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P. 2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1953).
69. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964).
70. See, e.g., Executive Office of the President, Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values,
56
(May
2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf (suggesting the development of a taxonomy of kinds of information that can be collected without consent, with consent, or never).
71. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
72. Christine Jolls, Rationality and Consent in Privacy Law 55 (Yale Law School, Working Paper
Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Alumni_Affairs/Jolls_RationalityandConsentinPrivacyLaw_1-21-10.pdf.
73. Id.
74. Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
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when there is a relationship between a consumer and a company; while to the Fourth
Amendment, the existence of that relationship means there is a lower privacy interest,
if any exists at all.
A company drafting privacy policies for household robots may thus wish to
strongly consider whether the policy adequately encompasses both industry standards and general privacy norms. As a practical matter, robots may be particularly illequipped to fit with the current U.S. notice-and-choice privacy regime, when they
lack capabilities for consumers to input privacy choices or are designed to calm consumers into accepting their activity. 75
5. Lulling People into Revealing Information
The reassuring or lying robot may receive harsh treatment when the deception
is driven by private actors. The treatment of deceptive private actors varies even more
noticeably from the Fourth Amendment’s permissive treatment of “false friends” and
lying law enforcement officers. Remember, when reporters lied and said they were
patients to gain access to a quack “doctor’s” home office, they were found to violate
his privacy.76
The FTC also enforces against deceptive actors, who lie to get private information.77 The FTC also, fascinatingly, enforces against actors that use technological
design to elicit information, or to falsely indicate that something is private when it is
not.78 This line of FTC enforcement against deceptive or unfair technological design
appears directly applicable to the anthropomorphic design characteristics of robots.
If a robot appears trustworthy where it is not, it may be deemed deceptive by the
FTC.79
6. Is Recording Speech (and whose)?
A final but very important issue with respect to the use of robots by private
actors involves a line of developing First Amendment doctrine. A number of appellate courts have recognized some version of a First Amendment “right to record,”

75. Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 Maryland L. Rev. 785, 794 (forthcoming
2015)(Mar. 23, 2015 8:03 AM), http://www.werobot2015.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Hartzog-UnfairDeceptive-Robots.pdf (“social robots are designed to draw us in”). See also Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the
Internet of Things: First Steps Towards Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent, 93 TEX. L.
REV. 85, 140–41 (2014) (explaining with respect to the Internet of Things that “[t]he basic mechanism of
notice and choice—to display and seek agreement to a privacy policy—can therefore be awkward in this
context because the devices in question do not facilitate consent.”).
76. Dietemann v. Time Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 245 (9th Cir. 1971); but see Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44
F.3d 1345, 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
77. E.g., Press Release, FTC, Website Operator Banned from the ‘Revenge Porn’ Business After
FTC Charges He Unfairly Posted Nude Photos (Jan. 29, 2015) available at https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2015/01/website-operator-banned-revenge-porn-business-after-ftc-charges.
78. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 74, at 642. (describing a line of FTC decisions on unfair design,
and pointing to In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, FTC File No. 062 3019, No. C-4195 (F.T.C. June 28, 2007)
and Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 19, FTC v. Frostwire, LLC, No. 1:11cv-23643 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2011)).
79. Hartzog, supra note 75, at 20 (asking in the context of evaluating FTC enforcement against
robots whether it matters that robots are “specifically designed to extract personal information through social
engineering”).
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often in the context of citizens using their cellular telephones to record police officers.80 A private company in Utah has used this “right to record” to challenge Utah’s
law governing information-gathering by automated license plate readers.81 Utah
amended the law so that it now applies only to law enforcement, and not private
actors.82
There is a real question of whether household robots—or really, the private
parties that built them or correspond with them—have a First Amendment “right to
record” in private spaces. Most interactions will be governed by voluntary privacy
policies that can be enforced by the FTC. But in instances where states wish to create
new privacy laws, they may have to keep the First Amendment in mind. Once again,
however, the fact that this information is being revealed and recorded in the home
may outweigh any interest in “newsworthy” information that might be revealed, under First Amendment newsgathering doctrine. In light of Supreme Court case law
rejecting distinctions between high value and low value speech, however, this argument might face obstacles in courts.
There is a legitimate question of whether robots or the private parties that programmed them constitute “speakers” at all. 83 Here, again, emergent behavior makes
for an interesting conversation. How directly involved in recording decisions do private actors have to be, to garner First Amendment protection? If a private actor decides to “record all,” will that gain more or less protection than somebody who records only short selections of information, or somebody who gives a robot the ability
to make its own decisions about what to record?
IV. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF WHAT HOME ROBOTS REVEAL
In conclusion, household robots reveal a number of interesting tensions in U.S.
privacy law. While the tensions exist now, even before the widespread introduction
of the new technology, the use of robots in the privileged private space of the household may bring these tensions to a head. Household robots, in other words, may be a
doctrinal privacy catalyst.
Doctrinally, household robots will require courts to further consider the relationship between privacy, permission, and trespass. Courts will have to decide
whether granting permission to an entity to be in a place also grants them permission
to record information about that space. Courts will have to reconsider whether information can be private against a larger audience, even if one agrees to share it with a
much smaller audience. Courts will also, in the Fourth Amendment context, have to
80. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651
(2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333
(11th Cir. 2000); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).
81. Cyrus Farivar, Private Firms Argue First Amendment Right to Collect License Plate Data,
ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 14, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/02/14/private-firms-argue-first-amendment-right-to-collect-license-plate-data/.
82. Tim Cushing, License Plate Reader Company Sues Another State For 'Violating' Its First
Amendment Right To Build A 1.8-Billion-Image Database, TECH DIRT (June 16, 2014, 3:37am)
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140613/09224127569/license-plate-reader-company-sues-anotherstate-violating-its-first-amendment-right-to-build-18-billion-image-database.shtml.
83. See generally Stuart M. Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L REV. 1445-1493
(2013); Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of Search Engine Speech, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1629 (2014); James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 868 (2014).
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reconcile treatment of the home as deserving of the utmost privacy protection with
the third party doctrine.
Considering household robots reveals two interesting substantive splits between the Fourth Amendment approach to privacy, and the approach we use to address private actors. First, the Fourth Amendment tends to take a broad view of consent as obviating a privacy interest, while law governing private actors can be more
skeptical; it sometimes looks to substantive privacy norms, or even protects privacy
interests precisely because information has been shared with third parties.84 Second,
Fourth Amendment doctrine is more permissive of lying to get information, while
law governing private actors enforces against deception—including deception by
technological design.
But perhaps what household robots most reveal is the continued need in the
United States for a holistic approach to big data. Currently, U.S. privacy law is a
patchwork of sectoral federal laws, in contrast with the EU’s holistic approach to
data privacy.85 To address both privacy and fairness problems raised by data gathering and analysis, we may wish to use household robots as an inspiration for enacting
data privacy laws, based on Fair Information Practices. Such governance could include rules on collection limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, accountability, and individual participation. 86
The United States currently relies on standards set by private parties and enforceable by the FTC. But perhaps the advent of household robots will finally bring
truly home the notion that data processing carries with it real privacy and unfairness
risks. Otherwise, Bill Gates’s hope of a robot in every home may go unrealized, and
many robots may—after a few prominent privacy violations— be left at the front
door.

84. Jolls, supra note 72, at 55.
85. Although there has been discussion of the two approaches converging more in practice than
the framework would indicate. See, e.g., Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy on the Books
and on the Ground, 63 Stan. L. Rev. (2011) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568385.
86. These are the principles advocated by the OECD in its 1980 Privacy Guidelines, which in turn
were based on the HEW Code of Fair Information Practices. See OECD Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2013), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm; see also Records, Computers and the
Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems (July
1973), available at http://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/default.html.

